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Quantum correlations as the resource for quantum communication can be distributed over long
distances by quantum repeaters. In this Letter, we introduce the notion of a noisy quantum re-
peater, and examine its role in quantum communication. Quantum correlations shared through
noisy quantum repeaters are then characterized and their secrecy properties are studied. Remark-
ably, noisy quantum repeaters naturally introduce private states in the key distillation scenario, and
consequently key distillation protocols are demonstrated to be more tolerant.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud, 03.67.-a
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols such as
the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) [1] have been imple-
mented in laboratories [2, 3], and become one of the most
important and promising applications of Quantum Infor-
mation Theory. QKD is now no longer an experiment but
an emerging market [4]. Further investigations on QKD
protocols will improve their practical performance under
realistic constraints [5]. To date, QKD reaches about
100 km in distance with photon sources through opti-
cal fibers, which however does not yet meet the distance
standard of present-day communication.
The communication distance is somehow limited as
any physical resource carrying quantum states suffer un-
wanted interactions with environment such as decoher-
ence and losses during transmission. In this sense, it is
natural to build a bridge for quantum correlations, for
instance quantum relay or quantum repeater, to over-
come the distance limit. Quantum repeaters are in fact
known to efficiently extend the communication distance
[6, 7], but unfortunately not feasible within current tech-
nology since the so-called quantum memory, that stores
quantum states for a while, is experimentally challenging.
Nevertheless, there have been remarkable experimental
results that envisage a feasible quantum memory in the
near future [8].
This work is therefore motivated by two perspectives.
First, a quantum memory in the near future, as being in
an earlier phase of development, would have a storage-
time long enough to distribute quantum correlations over
distances, but not sufficiently long to apply entanglement
distillation. The next arises from the fact that a practical
quantum repeater, being contacts to the quantum chan-
nels, would be susceptible to its surroundings. To be spe-
cific, as quantum repeaters are connected to one another
by possibly noisy quantum channels, errors caused by the
noisy channels will be ported to the quantum state of a
quantum memory of the repeater, i.e. quantum repeaters
become noisy. The question we address then is in what
way do noisy quantum repeaters feature in QKD scenar-
ios. It is actually not straightforward to conclude that
the secret key rate decreases, since noise effects do not
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FIG. 1: Successive applications of ΛRj for j = 1, · · · , N at in-
dividual quantum repeaters allow two honest parties to share
entangled states.
always degrade protocols [9]. Indeed, we will show that
noisy repeaters degrade the power of eavesdropper, called
Eve. In this Letter, we characterize quantum correlations
distributed through noisy quantum repeaters, and then
study distillation of secret key and entanglement. The
distribution scenario is described in the entanglement-
based scheme.
We first briefly review entanglement distribution
through a single quantum repeater, denoted by R, as-
suming that all quantum channels are perfect but only
limited in distance. The distribution scenario follows
the standard scheme in Ref. [7], as follows. Alice
first generates the maximally entangled state |φ1〉 where
|φ1〉 = (|00〉 + |11〉)/
√
2, keeps the first qubit, and send
the other one to the repeater. Bob does the same, and
the repeater then has two qubits in store. The entangle-
ment swapping (ES) protocol, denoted by ΛR, is applied
to the two qubits in store, and afterwards two honest
parties share the state |φ1〉AB. Here, the protocol ΛR is
composed of Bell-basis measurement on the two qubits
followed by the public announcement of the measurement
outcome, in order that two honest parties apply local op-
erations to rotate the shared state into |φ1〉. A quantum
repeater being a quantum device whose physical state is
described by a density operator, say ηR, as follows,
ΛR(|φ1〉AR ⊗ |φ1〉RB) = |φ1〉AB〈φ1| ⊗ ηR. (1)
It has been presumably of no interest to find out in which
2quantum state a quantum repeater remains. This is be-
cause of mainly two reasons: as it is seen in (1), a repeater
is factorized out from two honest parties by the Bell-basis
measurement of the ES protocol, meaning that no secret
correlations between the repeater and two honest parties
would be exploited [10]. In addition, it is often supposed
that a repeater stays in a constant state ηR all the time
not being affected by any change of its surroundings.
We now turn to the realistic constraints to quantum
channels and a quantum repeater. First, quantum chan-
nels are noisy in general, and therefore each of Alice and
Bob shares mixed states with the repeater. Here we re-
strict to cases where the mixed state is Bell-diagonal
in a single-copy level. If it is not the case, two hon-
est parties can apply local filtering operations such that
Bell-diagonal states are shared [11]. The filtering oper-
ation in fact increases the amount of entanglement, in
terms of entanglement of formation [12], of shared states
with some probability. Possible errors that may hap-
pen must be then one of three kinds, phase-shift, bit-flip,
or both. For each case, the shared state is one of Bell
states, where |φ2〉 = (1 ⊗Z)|φ1〉, |φ3〉 = (1 ⊗X)|φ1〉 and
|φ4〉 = (1 ⊗ iY )|φ1〉 with Pauli matrices X , Y , and Z.
Next, a practical quantum repeater, as a quantum de-
vice, would react susceptibly to a change of its surround-
ings. In particular, a quantum memory in the repeater
interacts with two qubits sent by two honest parties,
and thus two qubits stored become the effective environ-
ment of the repeater. Then, suppose that the two-qubit
state encoded by two honest parties are sent through and
perturbed in noisy channels. The isomorphism between
quantum channels and quantum states tells us that all
the properties of the noisy channels can be found in the
quantum state that have arrived at the repeater [13].
This means that, an error caused by noisy channels cor-
responds to a change in the repeater’s environment. In
terms of noise parameters, when |φi〉AR and |φj〉RB are
shared for some i and j depending on channel properties,
a repeater would be perturbed according to the noise i
and j. This is what we mean that a practical quantum
repeater is noisy.
We need to clarify here that it is two honest parties who
prepare and put a repeater in the middle. This means
that they already know the properties of the repeater,
how it reacts to each of phase-, bit-, and both errors, and
is perturbed. As well, the ES protocol in a repeater can-
not be designed to work by recognizing errors instance per
instance i.e. which pair of Bell-states is kept, but always
assumes the ideal case that |φ1〉AR⊗|φ1〉RB is shared. In
addition, we only suppose the minimal responsibilities to
a repeater, performing the ES protocol, and do not con-
sider cases where repeaters collaborate with two honest
parties or an eavesdropper.
After the ES protocol on |φi〉AR ⊗ |φj〉RB in the re-
peater, two honest parties share one of Bell states, de-
noted by |φk〉 where k is completely determined by the
error kinds i and j. The noisy quantum repeater can also
be captured by the single index, k, as follows,
ΛR(|φi〉AR ⊗ |φj〉RB) = |φk〉AB〈φk| ⊗ ηR(k). (2)
The repeater’s quantum state ηR(k) are known to two
honest parties since they have prepared a repeater. Like-
wise, in a general case when N noisy quantum repeaters
are located, Bell-diagonal states will also end up between
two honest parties, and the shared state would be finally
of the following form,
ρABR =
N⊗
n=1
Λ(|φ1〉Rn−1Rn ⊗ |φ1〉RnRn+1)
= β1|φ1〉AB〈φ1| ⊗ η1 + β2|φ2〉AB〈φ2| ⊗ η2
+ β3|φ3〉AB〈φ3| ⊗ η3 + β4|φ4〉AB〈φ4| ⊗ η4 (3)
where ηj is the normalized quantum state of N repeaters
when two honest parties share |φj〉. Interestingly, this is
exactly the state that has been considered in the context
of distillation of private states in Ref. [14], except only
that the states ηj do not belong to Alice and Bob but an
independent party, repeaters.
We have characterized quantum states shared through
noisy repeaters and noisy channels, exploiting the inde-
pendent party, repeaters, in the shared state. Before
starting secrecy analysis, we should first introduce the
important assumption on shared states, that quantum
states shared by two honest parties are made invariant
under any permutation of pairs i.e. symmetric states.
This can be done by random permutations. The quantum
de Finetti theorem then states that the most general N -
symmetric state, i.e. invariant under any permutations,
ρ(N) converges efficiently to the identically and indepen-
dently distributed (i.i.d.) one, ρ⊗NABR, as N becomes a
very large number [15]. This implies that in the con-
text of QKD, one does not have to go through the most
general case of N -symmetric states ρ
(N)
ABR but it suffices
to consider the i.i.d. one, the so-called collective attacks,
ρ⊗NABR [15]. The bound for the general security can be ob-
tained by analyzing collective attacks. In what follows,
we assume that the number of copies, N , becomes a very
large number to ensure applicability of the quantum de
Finetti theorem.
We now translate the scenario introduced in Ref. [14]
of distilling private states to that of distilling secret key
with noisy quantum repeaters. Since repeaters are sup-
posed to comprise an independent party not belonging to
two honest parties nor the eavesdropper, errors caused
by those repeaters have nothing to do with eavesdrop-
ping strategies and therefore do not have to be necessar-
ily corrected to distill secret key. This also means that
the quantum state representing the general security does
not necessarily correspond to |φ1〉AB . As it was pointed
out in [14], by introducing a party independent to two
honest parties and Eve, Eve’s purification power can be
3degraded. All this can be encapsulated by the so-called
private states, corresponding to the general security, as
follows,
γABR = U |φ1〉AB〈φ1| ⊗ ρRU †, (4)
where ρR is a repeater state and U =
∑
i,j |ij〉AB〈ij| ⊗
V i,jR is a unitary operation called twisting. Note that
a twisting U provides the equivalence class of private
states. The only difference is that the local assistance
by A
′
and B
′
in Ref. [14] is replaced with noisy quantum
repeaters.
In particular, we take a unitary operation, the untwist-
ing one U † in Ref. [16] that works for a state of the form
in (3) as follows,
ρABR = U
†σABRU (5)
where σAB(= trR[σABR]) =
∑
j λj |φj〉〈φj | is again Bell-
diagonal, with
λ1,2 =
1
2
(‖β1η1 + β2η2‖ ± ‖β1η1 − β2η2‖)
λ3,4 =
1
2
(‖β3η3 + η4β4‖ ± ‖β3η3 − β4η4‖), (6)
where the trace-norm of an operator A has been denoted
by ‖A‖ [16]. This untwisting operation shows the phase
errors that are necessary to be corrected for the ρABR
to be a private state. Note that repeaters are classically
correlated with two honest parties in the state σABR,
which means that measurement outcomes of two honest
parties are independent to quantum states of repeaters.
The relations above (5) and (6) reveal not only the reason
why not all errors existing in ρABR have to be corrected
but also how much errors are necessarily to be corrected.
First, the state that we are aiming to distill is a private
state, for which as it can be seen in (4) the state σAB in
(5) should be transformed to the state |φ1〉 by correct-
ing all errors there, though ρAB(= trR[ρABR]) may still
possess some errors. Next, σAB has less errors than ρAB,
which can be seen by comparing βj of ρAB in (3) to λj
of σAB in (6) for j = 1, 2, 3, 4. To be precise, it holds
that λj ≤ βj for j = 2, 3, 4 [17, 18]. Therefore, correct-
ing less errors that exist in σAB , two honest parties will
share secret key related to a private state. The question
followed is whether key distillation techniques such as ad-
vantage distillation and the standard one-way distillation
protocol commute with a twisting operation U . In fact,
the distillation techniques commute with twisting oper-
ations [17, 18] and therefore, no more additional step is
required in the key distillation scenario. The only differ-
ence in the classical step is that less errors are estimated
to be corrected.
We now analyze secrecy properties of quantum states
in (3) shared through noisy repeaters. Measuring ρ⊗NABR
in the computational basis, two honest parties are with
measurement outcomes of probability distribution,
pAB(i, j) = 〈iAjB|trRρABR|iAjB〉, (7)
to which key distillation techniques are then applied.
Note here the precondition for key distillation, that quan-
tum state from which secrecy is to be distilled must be
entangled [10]. In this case, σAB in (5) is the state where
secrecy is to be extracted, and once the state ρABR is
identified through state tomography, from the relation
(6) it can be easily checked if the state σAB is entangled.
The state σAB is entangled if and only if the follows holds
[12],
‖β1η1 − β2η2‖ > ‖β3η3 + β4η4‖. (8)
It is also worth mentioning a sufficient condition: if the
state ρAB is entangled, i.e. β1− β2 > β3 + β4, so is σAB.
This is clear from the inequality, β1−β2 ≤ ‖β1η1−β2η2‖,
that holds true for all β1,2 and η1,2.
We now consider the standard one-way communication
of error correction and privacy amplification to the mea-
surement outcomes of the probability distribution (7). A
lower bound to the one-way secret key rate has been de-
rived in Refs. [19], K→ ≥ IAB − IAE , where the mutual
information is denoted by I. It is then straightforward
to compute the lower bound to the key rate for measure-
ment outcomes in (7), as follows
K→ ≥ 1− h(x)−
∑
i=1,3
‖βiηi + βi+1ηi+1‖h(yi) (9)
where h(·) is the binary entropy, x = ‖β1η1 + β2η2‖ and
yi = (1 + ‖βiηi − βi+1ηi+1‖/‖βiηi + βi+1ηi+1‖)/2. One
can see from the security condition (9) how the quantum
states of quantum repeaters are relevant. In the following
example, we consider the BB84 protocol with noisy quan-
tum repeaters, and show that noisy quantum repeaters
make the protocol more tolerant.
Example.(BB84) In the entanglement-based scheme,
the shared quantum state in the BB84 protocol is iden-
tified in a single-copy level as
ρAB = (1−Q)2|φ1〉〈φ1|+Q(1−Q)|φ2〉〈φ2|
+Q(1−Q)|φ3〉〈φ3|+Q2|φ4〉〈φ4| (10)
where Q is the quantum-bit-error-rate(QBER) [20]. As a
toy model of noisy quantum repeaters, we here take the
shield states considered in Ref. [14] as their quantum
states, η1,3,4 = (ρs + ρa)
⊗l/2l and σ2 = ρ
⊗l
s , where ρa(s)
is the normalized d-dimensional projection operator onto
asymmetric(symmetric) space. These noisy quantum re-
peaters, where only η2 is different from the others, can
be interpreted as being sensitive to phase errors. Then,
the shared state in a single-copy level can be written as
follows,
ρABR = (1 −Q)2|φ1〉〈φ1| ⊗ η1 + (1−Q)Q|φ2〉〈φ2| ⊗ η2
+ (1 −Q)Q|φ3〉〈φ3| ⊗ η3 +Q2|φ4〉〈φ4| ⊗ η4. (11)
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FIG. 2: The lower bound to the secret key rate is shown for
different size of repeater states: l = 0 (without repeaters),
l = 4, and l = 10.
As we have shown, it suffices to consider errors existing
in the untwisted state σAB in (5) so that private states
in (4) are to be distilled. The lower bound to the secret
key rate can be computed from (9), and is depicted in
Fig. 2. When l becomes a very large number, the QBER
converges to Q = 24.5%, much higher than the known
bound 11.0% in Ref. [21].
The key distillation technique applying the two-way
(AD) followed by the one-way key distillation tolerates
higher values of QBER. This has been completely an-
alyzed in Ref. [17], which shows that if shared states
satisfy
‖β1η1 − β2η2‖2 > ‖β1η1 + β2η2‖‖β3η3 + β4η4‖, (12)
then secret key can be distilled. By this, quantum states
in a wider range are shown to be distilled to secret key.
In particular, if η1 is orthogonal to η2, i.e. tr[η1η2] = 0,
it holds that ‖β1η1 + β2η2‖ = ‖β1η1− β2η2‖, remarkably
meaning that the security condition in (12) coincides to
the precondition for key distillation (8). Therefore, for
this particular case, all secret correlations derived from
entangled states σAB can be converted to secrecy. To our
knowledge, this is the first case that entanglement itself
implies secrecy, although its general connection remains
open.
Finally, we would like to mention that noisy quan-
tum repeaters do not really play a role in distilling
entanglement. This is because, differently to key dis-
tillation where secret key rate matters, entanglement
distillation is concerned with the singlet fidelity F =
〈φ1|trR[ρABR]|φ1〉, where quantum repeaters are traced
out and therefore not considered. However, it would be
interesting still to characterize errors that pertain to the
distillation rate of entanglement.
To conclude, we have characterized quantum correla-
tions distributed through noisy quantum repeaters, and
shown that the scenario corresponds to the distillation of
private states. This helps to close the gap between two
extreme sides of QKD, one theoretical and the other prac-
tical. Remarkably, QKD protocols are shown to tolerate
higher values of QBER by noisy quantum repeaters. Here
the lesson to practical QKD over long distances, usually
having higher values of QBER, is that noise effects in-
dependent to Eve would make more tolerant protocols,
for instance, where noisy ES protocols are included. In
addition, although the scheme of quantum repeater intro-
duced in Ref. [7] is considered, our results can be easily
generalized to other variant schemes that are basically
equivalent to that in Ref. [7].
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